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REMEMBERING THE CLASSICs:
Impact of the CLASSICs Act on Memory Institutions, 
Orphan Works, and Mass Digitization
Shannon Price*
Abstract
The Music Modernization Act (MMA) promised to revolutionize the 
role of copyright in the music industry for artists, businesses, and entertain-
ment lawyers alike.  Title II of the MMA, the Classics Protection and Access 
Act (CLASSICs Act), extended federal copyright protection to pre–1972 sound 
recordings.  Advocates for the CLASSICs Act focused largely on its impact for 
pre–72 sound recording artists, who now possess a federally protected digi-
tal performance right in their recordings.  In the wake of the CLASSICs Act, 
however, scholars and practitioners will need to reckon with the Act’s conse-
quences for the millions of pre–72 sound recordings held and preserved by 
another group: American memory institutions.
Museums, libraries, archives, and other memory institutions have long 
advocated for federalization of copyright in pre–72 sound recordings as a 
superior alternative to the fifty-state patchwork that previously governed their 
collections.  Now that federalization has happened—and tens of millions of 
sound recordings have been pulled within the umbrella of federal copyright 
protection—it is time to evaluate whether and how the CLASSICs Act helps 
memory institutions to engage in publicly beneficial uses of their pre–72 sound 
recording collections.
This paper considers the impact of the CLASSICs Act on memory insti-
tutions’ ability to combat two of the most significant legal challenges that they 
face: orphan works and mass digitization.  Although the CLASSICs Act is at 
best a partial solution for orphan works and mass digitization, it has funda-
mentally changed the landscape for memory institution use of pre–72 sound 
recordings.  A thorough understanding of the Act’s implications will be crucial 
not only for memory institutions attempting to comply with copyright law, but 
also for the scholars and practitioners looking to advance future research and 
copyright reforms.
© 2019 Shannon Price. All rights reserved.
* J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School Class of 2020.
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Introduction
For well over a decade, artists, scholars, and practitioners alike have 
lamented the failure of copyright law to keep pace with the digital world.1 
1 See e.g., US Copyright Office, Section 108 of Title 17: A Discussion Document of 
the Registrar of Copyrights 1 (Sep. 2017) [hereinafter Section 108 Discussion Doc-
ument], https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section108/discussion-document.pdf [https://
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Music copyright was labelled a relic of the piano roll age, a badly outdated and 
inefficient system that hamstrung not only the creation of new music, but the 
preservation and public enjoyment of historical works.2  For libraries, archives, 
museums, and other institutions tasked with public education and preservation 
of historic sound recordings, outdated copyright laws presented a daunt-
ing obstacle.  The gap between best practices and uses allowed by copyright 
became so broad that, in 2010, the National Recording Preservation Board 
declared: “Were the law strictly enforced, it would brand virtually all audio 
preservation as illegal.”3  Memory institutions4 found it “virtually impossible to 
reconcile their responsibility for preserving and making accessible culturally 
important sound recordings with their obligation to adhere to copyright laws,” 
resulting in a legal landscape that respected neither artists’ rights nor the over-
arching goals of copyright.5
The Music Modernization Act (MMA) was signed into law on October 
11, 2018, and lauded as “the most important [music] legislation in a generation” 
for artists and songwriters.6  This paper addresses Title II of the MMA, also 
known as the “Classics Protection and Access Act” (CLASSICs Act), which 
extends federal protection to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972. 
Prior to passage of the CLASSICs Act, pre–72 sound recordings were governed 
by a patchwork of state law.7  Post–CLASSICs Act, all state laws concerning 
the “covered activities” of the new U.S.C. Title 17, Chapter 14 are preempted, 
perma.cc/XU3X-H3S3] (“For over a decade, the U.S. Copyright Office and other groups 
have explored the operation of section 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act (exceptions for 
libraries and archives) with an eye toward updating the provision for the digital age.”).
2 See Rob Bamberger & Sam Brylawski, Nat’l Recording Pres. Bd., The State of Re-
corded Sound Preservation in the United States: A National Legacy at Risk in 
the Digital Age (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter The State of Recorded Sound Preservation], 
http://www.loc.gov/programs/static/national-recording-preservation-board/documents/
pub148.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2B5-WU87].
3 Id. at 7.
4 This paper will refer collectively to museums, libraries, archives, and other nonprofit 
institutions with the primary purpose of preserving and increasing access to cultural 
heritage as “memory institutions,” a term kept purposefully vague to avoid the kind of 
false dichotomy between museums, archives and libraries present in Section 108, see 
infra Part III.
5 See The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3.
6 Hatch, Alexander: Senate Passes “Most Important Legislation in a Generation” to Help Song-
writers Be Paid Fair Market Value for Their Work, Sen. Lamar Alexander: Press Release (Sep. 
18, 2018), https://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ pressreleases?ID=31E44A3F-
991F-4665-98B3-E194F8812AAB [https://perma.cc/4QS8-Q4DK]. 
7 It is important to note that state law continues to govern rights ownership and public 
performance rights outside the scope of digital audio transmissions.  See generally 17 
U.S.C. § 1401.
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and rights owners of pre–1972 sound recordings are entitled to the same basic 
protections anywhere in the country.8,9
Popular press on the CLASSICs Act has focused on the Act’s consequences 
for pre–72 sound recording artists, who now possess a federally protected dig-
ital performance right in their recordings.10  The Act’s less- discussed impact on 
memory institutions, however, is immense—and of far broader public concern 
than how much money Dionne Warwick receives in royalties from Pandora.11 
The Society for American Archivists estimates that there are approximately 
46 million sound recordings housed in American cultural institutions, the vast 
majority of which have never been published.12  These recordings encompass 
far more than commercial music recordings (the copyright status of which is 
complicated by separate musical composition rights): sound recordings also 
include interviews, ethnographic field recordings, private home recordings, 
8 Covered activities under the CLASSICs Act include “any activity that the copyright 
owner of a [post–1972] sound recording would have the exclusive right to do or autho-
rize under section 106 or 602, or that would violate 1201 or 1202.” 17 U.S.C. § 1401(l)(1). 
Those who engage in “unauthorized acts” are subject to the same remedies provided 
by Sections 502–505 and 1203 for copyright infringers, although statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees are available to the rights owner only after the owner has filed with the 
Copyright Office and only for use occurring after the end of a 90-day period beginning 
when the filing is indexed into the Copyright Office’s public records.
9 The protection offered by the CLASSICs Act is sui generis rather than copyright, in 
large part because of Takings Clause concerns raised by the shift from state to federal 
law.  This means that although the CLASSICs Act is very similar to copyright, there are 
certain areas in which the CLASSICs Act will function differently than copyright.  No 
doubt with this possibility in mind, drafters of the CLASSICs Act explicitly incorpo-
rated various copyright exceptions and limitations into the legislation, including Sec-
tions 107, 108, 109 (first sale), 110 (exemption of certain performances and displays), 112 
(ephemeral reproductions), 114 (the digital performance compulsory license), and 512 
(the OSP safe harbor). 
10   See generally Robert Levine, Senate Introduces Bipartisan CLASSICS Act Cover-
ing Pre–1972 Recordings, Billboard (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/
business/8098693/senate-bipartisan-classics-act-pre-1972-recordings [https://perma.cc/
UW3M-T755]; Copyright Alliance, Copyright Alliance Commends Introduction of CLAS-
SICS Act in Senate (Feb. 7, 2018), https://copyrightalliance.org/news-events/press- releases/
classics-act-senate [https://perma.cc/A67Q-4W6K]; Jonathan Bailey, Understanding 
the CLASSICs Act, Plagiarism Today (July 20, 2017), https://www. plagiarismtoday.
com/2017/07/20/understanding-classics-act [https://perma.cc/H7EN-QVTC]. 
11 Dionne Warwick testified before Congress in favor of the CLASSICs Act, citing her 
1967 hit “I Say A Little Prayer.” See generally Justice For Legacy Musicians: U.S. Senate 
Moves To Close Decades-Old Loophole For “Pre-72” Recordings With CLASSICS Act, 
SoundExchange (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.soundexchange.com/news/justice-legacy-
musicians-u-s-senate-moves-close-decades-old-loophole-pre-72-recordings-classics-act 
[https://perma.cc/WM5N-ZX86].
12 US Copyright Office, Federal Copyright Protection for Pre–1972 Sound Record-
ings: A Report of the Register of Copyrights 53 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter Pre–72 
Sound Recordings Report], https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MU64-72WM].
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oral histories, and even scientific audio experiments.13  Moreover, unlike other 
copyrighted materials in the United States, “virtually no pre–1972 sound 
recordings have entered the public domain.”14  This means that American 
memory institutions are sitting atop a veritable gold mine of cultural and his-
torical materials—but nearly all uses of this material risk running afoul of 
copyright law.
Federalization of copyright in pre–72 sound recordings has long been 
supported by memory institutions as superior to the 50-state-patchwork that 
previously governed use of their pre–72 sound recording collections.15  Now 
that federalization has happened, it is time to evaluate whether and how the 
CLASSICs Act helps memory institutions engage in desired uses of copyrighted 
material and avoid copyright infringement.  In its 2011 report recommending 
federalization of pre–72 sound recordings, the Copyright Office identified two 
overarching goals for memory institutions with sound recording collections: 
1) ensuring preservation of pre–72 sound recordings, and 2) providing public 
access to pre–72 sound recordings.16  This paper assesses the CLASSICs Act’s 
impact on memory institutions’ ability to combat two of the most significant 
legal challenges to preservation and access projects: orphan works (or works 
without a readily identifiable rights holder) and mass digitization.
This paper proceeds in five parts.  Part I outlines the legal obstacles pre-
sented by orphan works and mass digitization and how these obstacles impede 
the ability of memory institutions to engage in desired preservation and 
access projects.  Part II discusses the primary infringement defenses currently 
employed by memory institutions—Section 108 and fair use—and evaluates 
the ways in which those defenses succeed and fail to serve the interests of 
modern memory institutions.  Part III outlines the CLASSICs Act’s response 
to the orphan works problem, as well as the role of the Section 108 and fair 
use defenses post–CLASSICs Act for small-scale use of orphan works.  Part 
IV considers mass digitization and the CLASSICs Act, concluding that nei-
ther the CLASSICs Act nor the fair use defense provides a workable mass 
digitization framework, and that Section 108 revision will be vital to enable 
preservation-and-access oriented mass digitization projects.
Finally, the conclusion explains that the legacy of the CLASSICs Act 
for memory institutions will hinge on legal developments outside of the Act’s 
control, including the Copyright Office’s recently published regulations,17 much-
needed Section 108 reform, and further litigation on mass digitization and fair 
use.  The CLASSICs Act is far from a solution to either the orphan works or 
mass digitization problems, but it does fundamentally change the landscape for 
13 Id. at 52.
14 Id. at 50.
15 The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 243.
16 Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 50.
17 37 C.F.R § 201.37 (2019).
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memory institution use of pre–72 sound recordings.  The potential of pre–72 
sound recordings to expand our understanding and enjoyment of American 
cultural heritage is difficult to overstate—whether copyright law will allow this 
potential to be realized is uncertain.  A thorough examination of the CLAS-
SICs Act is crucial not only for memory institutions attempting to comply with 
copyright law, but for the scholars and practitioners looking forward to future 
research and copyright reforms.
I. Dual Problems for Preservation and Access: Orphan Works 
and Mass Digitization
The utility of the CLASSICs Act for memory institutions should be eval-
uated in relation to those institutions’ goals, which, for purposes of this paper, 
will be broadly sorted into two categories recognized by the Copyright Office: 
1) preserving collections of pre–72 sound recordings, and 2) providing public 
access to pre–72 sound recordings.  The meaning of “public access” for a partic-
ular memory institution can vary; the “public” could include scholars, students, 
other researchers, artists, or the general population, and “access” could be 
remote or onsite, in a variety of formats.  It is critical to recognize that infringe-
ment can occur in the course of both ‘pure’ preservation projects and in user 
access projects.  Simply making a digital copy of a pre–72 sound recording for 
preservation could constitute actionable infringement, and distribution of that 
copy outside the institution is even more risky.  Memory institutions can elim-
inate liability for specific uses of copyrighted materials by obtaining ex ante 
permission from rights holders—but doing so requires a set of conditions that 
are far from given.  First, there must actually be an identifiable rights hold-
er(s) for the copyrighted work(s): this is the orphan works problem.  Second, 
the project must be structured so that identifying rights holders and obtaining 
permissions for relevant works is logistically feasible: this is the mass digitiza-
tion problem.
A. Orphan Works: Scope of the Problem Pre–CLASSICs Act
Defined by the Copyright Office as original works of authorship “for 
which a good faith prospective user cannot readily identify and/or locate 
the copyright owner(s) in a situation where permission from the copyright 
owner(s) is necessary as a matter of law,” orphan works are one of the most 
complex and pervasive challenges facing the modern copyright system.18  A 
classic example of an orphan sound recording is an unidentified disc, found 
in an abandoned box without any discernible mark of authorship.  The artist 
or author who locates and wishes to use the disc faces what amounts to a 
18 US Copyright Office, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: A Report of the 
 Registrar of Copyrights 9 (June 2015) [hereinafter Orphan Works and Mass Digitiza-
tion], https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UM88-XUMV].
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convoluted and high-risk gamble, juggling the danger that a rights holder could 
appear with the fuzzy boundaries of the fair use defense and the looming pos-
sibility of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.  A memory institution, which 
is likely to possess scores of orphan sound recordings,19 faces similar risks on 
an exponential scale.  Performing these recordings in exhibitions or making 
them available to researchers and visitors could render the institution liable for 
copyright infringement—keeping the recordings locked away severely under-
cuts the value and potential uses of the collection.
Widespread scholarly and government attention to orphan works over 
the last two decades reflects a near-universal dissatisfaction with the current 
status quo.  Orphan works have been referred to as the “20th-century digi-
tal black hole,”20 and, in the more measured words of the Copyright Office, “a 
frustration, a liability risk, and a major cause of gridlock in the digital market-
place.”21  The process of identifying a work as an ‘orphan’ inevitably involves 
“an unsuccessful and often costly search [for rights holders].”22  Older and 
unpublished works present a particularly difficult challenge, as identifying 
information associated with the sound recording may long since have been 
lost.23  To put the problem in context, the Society of American Archivists has 
determined that the number of unpublished sound recordings held by Ameri-
can cultural institutions “far surpass[s] the number of commercially published 
sound recordings that have ever been released.”24  Yet for nonprofit archival 
institutions, the cost and legal uncertainty involved in even the first step of 
orphan works use—determining whether the work is or is not a true ‘orphan’—
often becomes prohibitive.  This logistical reality means that “projects relying 
upon orphan works often do not go forward,” despite their clear ability to 
advance an institution’s preservation and access goals.25  Legal uncertainty 
(and the cost of combating it) results in a landscape where orphan works in 
memory institution collections not only stay orphans, but stay hidden from 
public view, at the tragic risk of being lost to our cultural history altogether.
19 Id. at 38 (“Studies of library collections of printed, published books and similar works 
estimate that between 17% and 25% of published works and as much as 70% of special-
ized collections are orphan works.”).
20 See generally Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, Copyright and Mass Digiti za -
tion: A Cross-Jurisdictional Perspective (2013), Rebecca J. Rosen, The Missing 20th 
Century: How Copyright Protection Makes Books Vanish, Atlantic (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/the-missing-20th-century-how-
copyright-protection-makes-books-vanish/255282 [https://perma.cc/YHA2-RNK6].
21 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 35. 
22 Id. at 36. 
23 Id. at 10.
24 Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 53.
25 Id. at 36. 
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B. Mass Digitization: Scope of the Problem Pre–CLASSICs Act
Mass digitization projects are complicated at the start by the fact that 
such projects do “not lend [themselves] to a precise definition.”26  There is 
little agreement on just how “massive” a digitization project must be to qual-
ify, nor on what purpose a mass digitization project should serve.  In general, 
mass digitization involves copying large numbers of analog materials in dig-
ital form; the digital copies can then be permanently stored and used for a 
near-infinite variety of public or restricted-access archives, functions, and pro-
grams.  Exemplary mass digitization projects available to the public include 
the Internet Archive,27 Open Library,28 the Open Content Alliance,29 Europe-
ana,30 and Google Books.31  Despite the lack of any clear legal framework for 
mass digitization in the United States, the Library of Congress has joined the 
fray, collaborating with UNESCO on the World Digital Library32 and making 
thousands of its own collection items—sound recordings included—available 
online.33  For its proponents, mass digitization holds the explosive potential to 
“provide free global access to ‘all the significant literary, artistic, and scientific 
works of mankind’” to anyone with an Internet connection.34  For its oppo-
nents, mass digitization “turn[s] copyright on its head,” destroying the ex ante 
permissions on which the system is based.35
The potential of mass digitization to serve memory institutions’ larger 
goals of preservation and access is clear.  For sound recordings in particular, 
effective preservation “means, for all practical purposes, digital preservation.”36 
However, the possibility of mass infringement damages arising from mass dig-
itization has previously limited the scope of projects that memory institutions 
are willing and able to engage in.37  Such projects involve significant resource 
26 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 72.
27 See Internet Archive (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://archive.org [https://perma.cc/
HXM6-J9MC], for access to these projects.
28 See Open Library (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://openlibrary.org [https://perma.
cc/9353-S5XD], for access to these projects.
29 For access to these projects, see Open Content Alliance (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://archive.org/details/opencontentalliance [https://perma.cc/LL52-3KVV].
30 For access to these projects, see Euopeana Collections (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.europeana.eu/portal/en [https://perma.cc/H36F-V4UR].
31 For further discussion, see Busse, infra note 80, at 131.
32 See World Digital Library (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.wdl.org/en [https://
perma.cc/KH83-2BZ7]. 
33 For access to these projects, see Library of Congress (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://
www.loc.gov/search/?q= [https://perma.cc/4E3Z-LP2K]. 
34 Busse, infra note 80, at 132. 
35 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 74.
36 Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 59. 
37 Id. at 74.  Indeed, because of the practical impossibility of securing clearances on a 
work-by-work basis, current mass digitization projects in the United States either are 
limited to public domain works or rely on the fair use doctrine to justify copying and 
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investment up front, and the sheer quantity of works being copied renders 
securing clearances on a work-by-work basis a “practical impossibility.”38  This 
logistical problem is compounded by the presence of orphan works in memory 
institution collections, for which no amount of searching will produce a rights 
holder.  Uncertainty about the level of public access that will be legally per-
missible makes mass digitization funding a difficult pitch for donors, on whom 
memory institutions rely to initiate projects.39  In practice, the possibility of 
infringement renders all but the most niche digitization projects to be high-
stakes legal gambles.40  Some institutions, the Library of Congress included, are 
going ahead with these projects anyways—but as with any gamble, the odds of 
losing big continue to deter potential players and to limit the size of the bets.
Although the Copyright Office has expressed its support for an extended 
collective licensing program (ECL) to deal with mass digitization, no model 
legislation has been proposed, and the possibility of an ECL solution remains 
remote.41  This means that the CLASSICs Act is the most recent legislation 
affecting mass digitization in memory institutions—if only for pre–72 sound 
recordings—and may remain so for years to come.
II. Section 108 and Fair Use: The Primary Infringement Defenses  
for Memory Institutions Pre–CLASSICs Act
The Copyright Act provides a variety of statutory defenses to infringe-
ment that can be specifically invoked by memory institutions, including Sections 
107, 108, 109, 110, 121, 504(c)(2), and 602(a)(3)(C).  Of these defenses, Section 
108, “Reproduction by libraries and archives,” and Section 107, “Fair use,” are 
most relevant to a discussion of memory institutions and pre–72 sound record-
ings under the CLASSICs Act.  In the following Part, I discuss the mechanics 
and shortcomings of both defenses prior to passage of the CLASSICs Act.  This 
discussion provides the framework for my assessment in Parts III and IV of 
how these defenses will continue to function post–CLASSICs Act in the con-
text of orphan works and mass digitization.
A. Section 108: Reproduction by Libraries and Archives
Section 108, sometimes referred to as the “Library Exception,” out-
lines an exception to the exclusive rights of copyright holders for certain uses 
using works or parts of works without the rights holders’ advanced authorization.  Id.
38 Id. at 74.
39 The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 7 (“The perception that re-
cordings held by institutions are unlikely to be accessible discourages private collectors 
from depositing their holdings with institutions” and from donating money.).
40 See Busse, infra note 80, at 143 for a discussion of “niche digitization projects.”
41 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 72 (“[W]e are recommending 
the adoption of an extended collective licensing pilot program that would provide full-
text access to works under conditions to be agreed upon between rightsholder and user 
representatives.”). 
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by libraries and archives.42  Specifically, Section 108 states that “it is not an 
infringement of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees 
acting within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than one 
copy or phonorecord of a work . . . or to distribute such copy or phonorecord,” 
so long as (1) the reproduction is made without any purpose of commercial 
advantage, (2) the institution’s collections are open to the public or to unaffil-
iated researchers, and (3) the reproduction includes a notice of copyright.43  A 
library or archive may make additional copies (up to 3, and subject to a litany 
of conditions) of an unpublished work or of a published work that is damaged, 
deteriorating, lost, stolen, or in an obsolete format.44  Subsections 108(d),(e), 
and (g) lay out the conditions for a library or archive to permissibly share 
copies with users or to participate in an interlibrary loan program, and Sub-
section 108(h) allows for relatively broad use of noncommercially exploited 
works in their last 20 years of copyright protection.45
At its best, Section 108 “carves out a complex but workable framework 
for library reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works in a variety of 
common archival and lending situations.”46  For eligible memory institutions—
which notably do not include museums or universities—demonstration that a 
particular reproduction or distribution is authorized by Section 108 functions 
as an affirmative defense to an infringement action.  Particularly as it concerns 
individual, physical user copies and interlibrary loans, Section 108 provides a 
much needed “modicum of certainty for libraries .  .  . [in the uses] necessary 
for day-to-day operations.”47  Subsections 108(b) and (c) are particularly well-
suited to small-scale preservation projects of traditional print materials, and 
subsection 108(f)—which eliminates library/archive liability for the unsuper-
vised copying of library/archive patrons—insulates covered institutions from a 
potentially crippling source of liability.
Remarkably little litigation has tested the boundaries of Section 108.48 
Some actors have argued that, since libraries and archives are so rarely sued 
for copyright infringement, it does not matter whether they are technically 
engaged in illegal activity or not.49  Of course, this attitude undoubtedly 
42 Laura N. Gasaway, Amending the Copyright Act for Libraries and Society: The Section 
108 Study Group, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 1331, 1334 (2007).
43 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2012).
44 Id. § 108(b)–(c). 
45 See Gasaway, supra note 43, at 1135–38 (a member of the Section 108 Study Group 
summarizing 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(d), (e), (g), and (h)).
46 David R. Hansen, Copyright Reform Principles for Libraries, Archives, and Other Mem-
ory Institutions, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1559, 1567 (2014). 
47 Id. at 1579.
48 Id. at 1572 (“Westlaw reports only thirty opinions actually citing to section 108.  Of 
those, only two, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust and Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. Car-
ey, have interpreted section 108 in a lawsuit involving a nonprofit library or archive.”).
49 Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 70. 
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“foster[s] disrespect for copyright law,” and provides “little more than cold 
comfort” to memory institutions attempting to minimize their potential liabil-
ity.50  Assuming that memory institutions wish to operate within the confines 
of the law, commentators tend to agree “that section 108 has been asked . . . to 
provide library-like institutions with a useful, clear, and unambiguous excep-
tion that practicing librarians can employ to make decisions about the use of 
copyrighted works in recurring library situations”—an exception which oper-
ates in tandem with fair use and other infringement defenses.51  Given this 
purpose, the effectiveness of Section 108 as a tool for memory institutions 
will be evaluated here in context of two inquiries: (1) whether the Section 108 
exception truly is clear and unambiguous in application; and (2) whether the 
specific reproductions and distributions permitted under Section 108 corre-
spond with the reproductions and distributions that memory institutions are 
regularly asked to, or aim to, undertake.
B. Shortcomings of Section 108 Protection
Section 108 has been targeted as an area for copyright reform by memory 
institutions, universities, the Copyright Office, and even the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office since the early 2000s.52  Complaints about (and suggested 
reforms to) the current form of Section 108 can be broadly sorted into three 
categories of concern: eligibility, preservation and replacement, and user 
access.  In each area, current application of Section 108 is relatively clear.  How-
ever, widening gaps between best practices employed by memory institutions 
and the specific uses protected under Section 108 are rendering the “Library 
Exception” increasingly obsolete, at risk of becoming a “useless appendage to 
the Copyright Act, an exception so narrowly tailored to bygone technologies 
that it will be functionally irrelevant.”53
1. Eligibility: Section 108(a)(2)
Currently, the only institutions eligible for Section 108 protection are 
libraries and archives that meet the requirements of Section 108(a)(2).54 
Libraries or archives that exist within a larger museum may be eligible, but the 
museum itself is not, which—for larger institutions especially—can raise legal 
obstacles to cooperative programming.  Moreover, smaller museums that do not 
have affiliated libraries or archives fall completely outside the scope of Section 
50 Id.
51 Hansen, supra note 47, at 1563.
52 Id. at 1576–77.
53 Laura Gasaway et al., Session 1: The Legal Landscape, 36 Colum. J.L. & Arts 527, 529 
(2013). 
54 17 U.S.C. §  108(a)(2) requires that “the collections of the library or archives are (i) 
open to the public, or (ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library 
or archives or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing 
research in a specialized field.”  17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (2007).
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108, despite the fact that they “have the same need [as libraries and archives] 
to reproduce and distribute copies of works to researchers and scholars.”55  The 
level of public accessibility that an institution provides and the scope of profes-
sional services offered—both of which could conceivably be higher for a given 
museum than a given archive or library—are not relevant considerations for 
eligibility.  The question of virtual-only memory institutions, which are particu-
larly relevant to sound recordings,56 is left entirely unaddressed.
2. Preservation and Replacement: Sections 108(b), (c), and (h)
Under the current form of Section 108, a library or archive may make 
up to three copies of an unpublished work for preservation and security pur-
poses—the library or archive may not make preservation copies of a published 
work.57  Published works may be replaced with up to three copies under Sec-
tion 108(c), but only if: (1) the work is already damaged, deteriorating, lost, 
stolen, or in an obsolete format; and (2) the library or archive has determined 
that an unused replacement copy cannot be obtained at a fair price.58  If a pres-
ervation copy of an unpublished work or a replacement copy of a published 
work is reproduced in a digital format, that digital copy may not be made avail-
able outside the physical premises of the library or archive.59,60
The limited and outdated nature of Section 108’s preservation and 
replacement exceptions is apparent even upon passing inspection—and, upon 
further reflection, alarming.  These exceptions were undoubtedly “developed 
with analog materials in mind . . . [and] do not adequately address the preser-
vation of digital materials or the ways in which digital technology can facilitate 
the preservation of analog works.”61  The three copy limit in both Sections 
108(b) and (c), for example, is based on the microfilm preservation prac-
tices that dominated the field during the passage of the DMCA62; it is barely 
workable in the context of digital copies—which are the primary modern pres-
ervation mechanism for sound recordings63—because digital copies are made 
55 Gasaway, supra note 43, at 1339.
56 The digital-only Internet Archive, for example, has more than 2 million sound record-
ings currently available to its users, the copyright status of which varies.  See Com-
munity Audio, Internet Archive (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://archive.org/details/
opensource_audio [https://perma.cc/2HGL-BQLH].
57 17 U.S.C. § 108(b) (2012).
58 Id. § 108(c).
59 Id. §§ 108(b)–(c).
60 Section 108 Study Group, Section 108 Study Group Rpt. 17 (2008), http://www.sec-
tion108.gov/docs/Sec108StudyGroupReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAN2-BTBM] (cit-
ing S. Rep. No. 105–190 at 62 (1998)).
61 Id. at 17 n.43. 
62 “The three-copy limit under the current section 108 was a DMCA amendment intended 
to address the need to make digital copies and was based on microfilm preservation 
practices.”  Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 25.
63 Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 59. 
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and remade each time a digital work is accessed, transmitted, or used.64  For a 
work “born digital,” which “must be copied many times over, at its acquisition 
and throughout its life . . . [lest it] become irretrievable and inaccessible,” the 
three copy limit completely forecloses Section 108 protection.65  Furthermore, 
the published/unpublished distinction between Sections 108(b) (preservation) 
and (c) (replacement) implies that preservation copies of published works are 
unnecessary; it assumes that if the work is published, then it is also commer-
cially available outside the memory institution, and additional copies beyond 
the confines of Section 108(a) are not justified by a need for preservation or 
security.  This assumption is untenable in the context of orphan and out-of-
print works, which—published or not—can be lost to history if not preserved 
by memory institutions.66
For sound recordings, the publication status of which may be espe-
cially difficult to determine,67 68 the published/unpublished dichotomy results 
in a decidedly unattractive set of options.  A library or archive may (1) hope 
that a sound recording is unpublished and make preservation copies at risk of 
infringement, or (2) assume that the sound recording is published, then wait 
until the recording is damaged or deteriorating to attempt to replace/preserve 
it.  This dilemma could probably be avoided by resort to fair use.  In fact, oppo-
nents of Section 108 reform have suggested that changes to Sections 108(b) 
and (c) are unnecessary for this reason.69  However, this very argument reveals 
the Achilles’ heel of Section 108’s preservation and replacement exceptions: 
they are so limited in application that it would be best to rely on something 
else entirely.
One other subsection of 108 bears on memory institutions’ ability to pre-
serve and replace works in their collections: Section 108(h).  Added to Section 
108 as part of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, Section 
64 Section 108 Study Group Report, supra note 61, at 44.
65 Id. at 44, 100.
66 “[T]here are instances in which a preservation copy of a published work may be nec-
essary, such as when that work is out-of-print or is orphaned.”  Section 108 Discussion 
Document, supra note 2, at 27.
67 For a further discussion of the difficulties of determining when a work has or has not 
been published, see Aaron C. Young, Copyright’s Not So Little Secret: The Orphan 
Works Problem and Proposed Orphan Works Legislation, 7 Cybaris Intell. Prop. L. 
Rev. 202, 209 (2016). 
68 “‘Publication’ occurs when copies or phonorecords of a work are distributed to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or lending.  Publication 
also occurs when a copyright owner offers to distribute copies or phonorecords of a 
work to a group of persons for the purpose of further distribution or public perfor-
mance.  A public performance of a musical composition does not, in and of itself, con-
stitute publication.”  U.S Copyright Office, Circular 50: Copyright Registration for Mu-
sical Compositions 3 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ50.pdf [https:// perma.
cc/5TPS-VABF].
69 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 11.
92 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 26:79
108(h) provides expanded rights of reproduction, distribution, display, and per-
formance to libraries and archives when a work is within the last 20 years of its 
copyright.70  These rights apply “for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or 
research,” and at first glance provide an enormous workaround of the limita-
tions of Sections 108(b) and (c).  Like the rest of Section 108, however, Section 
108(h) is subject to critique.  The exception is conditioned a set of “onerous” 
requirements, which include the following:
No reproduction, distribution, display, or performance is authorized under 
this subsection if—
the work is subject to normal commercial exploitation;
a copy or phonorecord of the work can be obtained at a reasonable price; or
the copyright owner or its agent provides notice pursuant to regulation pro-
mulgated by the Register of Copyrights that either of the conditions set forth 
in subparagraphs (A) and (B) applies.71
The time and resources necessary to determine whether a work is sub-
ject to “normal commercial exploitation” (or what, in fact, ‘normal’ commercial 
exploitation legally means) represent a significant barrier for memory institu-
tions seeking to invoke Section 108(h) protection.  The additional requirement 
that a copy or phonorecord of the sound recording cannot be obtained else-
where at reasonable price (with the definition of ‘reasonable’ also up for 
debate) renders the Section 108(h) inquiry so burdensome that “few libraries 
have actually taken advantage” of its broad protections up to this point.72
3. User Copies: Sections 108(d), (e), and (i)
Yet another critique of Section 108 is that the exception restricts user 
access to the collections of memory institutions beyond what is necessary to 
protect the interests of rights holders.  Sections 108(d) and (e) lay out the con-
ditions under which a library or archive may transfer a single copy of part of 
a work (Section 108(d)) or an entire work (Section 108(e)) to a user.  Both 
subsections allow for a single copy to be made by the library or archive upon 
request of the user and to become the property of the user after it is trans-
ferred; a library or archive may not retain copies made under Sections 108(d) 
and (e) and must ensure that whatever user-request mechanism it provides 
contains a prominent copyright notice.  A copy of an entire work is authorized 
under Section 108(e) only after a library or archive “has first determined, on 
the basis of a reasonable investigation, that a copy or phonorecord of the copy-
righted work cannot be obtained at a fair price,” and copies under both Sections 
108(d) and (e) must be used solely for private study, scholarship, or research.73
70  17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2012).
71  Id. § 108(h)(2); Gasaway, supra note 43, at 1336.
72 Gasaway, supra note 42, at 1336.
73 The archive is not liable for subsequent use so long as it does have notice that the copy 
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Like the rest of Section 108, Sections 108(d) and (e) were “drafted with 
analog copying in mind, principally photocopying.”74  Since digital copying 
requires the creation of multiple, incidental and temporary copies, digital copy-
ing is not currently authorized by Sections 108(d) and (e)—despite the fact 
that digital copying is the current method of choice for reproducing a sound 
recording.  Section 108(i) further states that the rights of reproduction and 
distribution for user copies under Sections 108(d) and (e) “do not apply to a 
musical work, a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, or a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual work dealing with news.”75 
This limitation means that Section 108 provides no mechanism for libraries and 
archives to copy most non-text-based works for their users.  Although sound 
recordings themselves do not qualify as “musical works” under the Copy-
right Office’s current definition,76 the compositions and lyrics underlying those 
recordings are musical works with independent copyright status.  Subsection 
108(i) consequently forecloses an important avenue that memory institutions 
might have used to circumvent limitations on digital copying of sound record-
ings for research: a library may not send the sheet music or lyrics underlying a 
sound recording to a researcher as a substitute for that recording.  Ultimately, 
the nexus of limitations created by Sections 108(d), (e), and (i) ensures a very 
narrow sound recording exception: to be authorized under Sections 108(d) 
or (e), a sound recording copy would have to be nondigital, fully transferable 
to the user (not streamed) and either incomplete (under Section 108(d)) or 
currently unavailable on the market (under Section 108(e)); to be authorized 
under Section 108(i), this nondigital, fully transferable, and either incomplete 
or unavailable sound recording must also be in a format that does not impli-
cate an underlying musical work.  Given these restrictions, it is no wonder that 
the current form of Section 108 creates “a disproportionate impact on some 
academic disciplines, such as music and art scholarship.”77  Even in cases when 
a particular sound recording does meet the requirements of Sections 108(d) 
or (e), these subsections “are little used by public libraries,” who actually face 
less chance of liability (under Section 108(f)) when they allow users to make 
explicitly infringing copies on their own.78
would be used for a purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 108(e) (2012).
74 Section 108 Study Group Report, supra note 61, at 100.
75 17 U.S.C § 108(i) (2012).
76 Although a “musical work” is not defined in the Copyright Act, it is defined by the 
Copyright Office as “original compositions and original arrangements or other new ver-
sions of earlier compositions to which new copyrightable authorship has been added.” 
Circular 50: Copyright Registration for Musical Compositions, supra note 69, at 1.
77 Section 108 Study Group Report, supra note 61, at 107.
78 Gasaway, supra note 43, at 1350.
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C. Fair Use, Campbell, and Development of the “Transformative” Standard
Given the limited nature of the Section 108 exemption, museums, librar-
ies, and archives increasingly rely on fair use to protect themselves from 
copyright liability.  At its core, the fair use defense acknowledges that, in some 
situations, “the underlying purpose of copyright law—to benefit the public by 
promoting the progress of creative works—supersedes the exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner.”79  Fair use is a balancing act between the copyright 
holder’s interest and the public interest, and “[t]he less adverse effect that an 
alleged infringing use has on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain, the 
less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.”80  As codified in 17 U.S.C. 
Section 107, the fair use defense is established through a four factor inquiry, in 
which courts consider: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.81
The defining Supreme Court case for the four-part Section 107 inquiry 
was Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which concerned 2 Live Crew’s 1989 
rap parody (titled “Pretty Woman”) of the 1964 rock ballad “Oh, Pretty Wom-
an.”82  2 Live Crew had successfully established fair use before the District 
Court, but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that 
“‘the admittedly commercial nature’ of the parody ‘require[d] the conclusion’” 
of unfair use under Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.83 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and 
remanded the case, holding that the Sixth Circuit erred both in its conclusion 
“that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ 
rendered it presumptively unfair . . . [and] in holding that 2 Live Crew had nec-
essarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic 
purpose of the use.”84
The Campbell court established that, although “transformative use is not 
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use . . . [transformative works] lie at 
the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
79 Timothy J. Busse, Crossing the Digital Rubicon: Google Books and the Dawn of an Elec-
tronic Literature Revolution, 18 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 119, 123 (2018).   
80 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981).
81 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
82 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1994).
83 Id. at 574 (citing Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992)).
84 Id. at 594.
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confines of copyright.”85  The more transformative the new work is, the less sig-
nificance other factors weighing against fair use hold, including the commercial 
versus noncommercial use determination under Section 107(1).86  Emphasiz-
ing that the fair use activities outlined by Section 107—criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research—”are generally conducted 
for profit in this country,”87 the Campbell court concluded that “Congress 
could not have intended” a presumption that all commercial uses are unfair 
uses—a “presumption [that] would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses.”88 
Instead, “fair use would be a true multi-factor test in which factors two, three, 
and four would be assessed and weighed in line with the degree of transforma-
tiveness of the use, rather than the market-centered presumptions set out in 
Sony and Harper & Row.”89
The “transformative” test articulated in Campbell remains the governing 
framework for the fair use inquiry today; if a work is deemed “transformative,” 
the rest of the Section 107 factors tend to fall in line.90  However, as is perhaps 
inevitable with any “true multi-factor test,” the fair use inquiry has received 
substantial criticism—pre– and post–Campbell—for its uneven and unpredict-
able application across time and jurisdictions.  A series of empirical studies 
published over the last decade suggest that lower courts “largely ignored” the 
Campbell framework until around 2005, at which point a “gradual shift began 
toward a focus on transformative use” began.91  Scholars have referred to the 
resulting body of doctrine as “billowing white goo,” in which “[b]ounded copy-
right rights have flowed out all over the place” and fair use has contorted itself 
into whatever shape necessary to provide a defense.92  In the words of David 
Nimmer, “reliance on the four statutory factors to reach fair use decisions often 
seems naught but a fairy tale”—and an expensive fairy tale at that.93  Knowing 
that a “transformative use” will be allowed is different than knowing whether 
a particular use will be considered “transformative,” and litigation, win or lose, 
may be the only way to find out.
85 Id. at 579.
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 584 (citing Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985)).
88 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
89 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 715, 723 
(2011).
90 Of course, it is entirely possible that courts continue to make the subjective judge-
ment of what feels like a “fair” outcome in an infringement case before conducting any 
kind of “transformative” analysis, then apply the transformative label retroactively to 
achieve the desired outcome.  See generally Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio 
State L.J. 47 (2012). 
91 Busse, supra note 80, at 128. 
92 Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 587, 596 (2008).
93 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 263, 287 (2003).
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D. Fair Use by Memory Institutions: Potential Benefits for Memory 
Institutions and Critiques
Not all assessments of fair use doctrine are as pessimistic as Nimmer’s 
fairy tale.  In fact, opponents of Section 108 reform have repeatedly assured 
the Copyright Office that “many libraries and archives are comfortable with 
[an] approach” in which fair use is relied upon to fill gaps in Section 108 cov-
erage.94  On the other hand, fair use “does not provide certainty to those 
who do not have the legal or monetary resources to analyze each potential 
fair use . . . [and] leave[s] libraries and archives without a robust, certain safe 
harbor for their essential, everyday activities.”95  The most relevant fair use 
considerations for the purposes of this paper are: (1) whether a memory insti-
tution can reliably predict the outcome of the fair use inquiry and apply that 
prediction to enable its activities, and (2) what existing doctrine can tell us 
about the viability of the fair use defense in the context of orphan works and 
mass digitization.  The following section considers both of these questions pre–
CLASSICs Act, providing a foundation from which to discusses the impact of 
the CLASSICs Act on fair use defenses for orphan works and mass digitization 
projects in Parts III and IV.
1. Can a Memory Institution Reliably Predict the Outcome 
of the Fair Use Inquiry and Apply That Prediction to Enable 
Its Activities?
The simple and unsatisfying answer is: It depends.  Memory institutions 
so rarely appear in court that the accuracy of their fair use predictions is impos-
sible to deduce from case law.  From a policy perspective, the fair use argument 
on behalf of memory institutions is compelling, because the core mission of 
such institutions—to preserve cultural heritage, enable research and scholar-
ship, and expand public access to historical knowledge and works—is aligned 
with the very purpose of copyright, to “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts.”96  Most uses of copyrighted material by memory institutions can be 
considered noncommercial and educational, which weighs in favor of fair use 
under Section 107(1).  Moreover, the types of memory institution uses most 
likely to lead to infringement damages—such as reproduction and distribution 
of “orphan” works that turn out not to be orphans—are arguably motivated by 
the “nature of the work” as a valuable historical artifact not currently accessi-
ble to the public at large.97  A rights holder will be hard-pressed to demonstrate, 
94 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 14. 
95 Id. at 15.
96 U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.
97 See Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1379, 1394 (2012) (“This more probing approach to the nature-of-
work factor has much to recommend it, especially in orphan works cases.  In general, 
such an inquiry can illuminate whether copyright’s creation and dissemination goals are 
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for example, that a library’s copying and distributing of a presumed-to-be-or-
phan sound recording to a handful of researchers has a substantial impact on 
the potential market for that work.
As compared to Section 108, however, the fair use defense has serious 
drawbacks, chief among them the uncertainty and expense of potential litiga-
tion.  Even assuming that fair use doctrine is fully coherent, fair use is a highly 
fact-specific inquiry; the size, reach, purpose, type of collections, nonprofit 
status, and technological sophistication of a particular memory institution are 
all relevant (but certainly not exclusive) considerations for a court.98  Unless a 
nigh-on-identical memory institution has engaged in the same type of use with 
the same type of works on the same scale—and successfully defended that use 
as fair use in court—a memory institution seeking to evaluate and minimize its 
potential liability for infringement is left with only conjecture.  Best practices 
documents, which often provide a compendium of current industry practice 
and guidance for future behavior, are of some help in this area and can be cited 
as evidence supporting fair use.  However, such best practices “run the risk of 
being more of an aspirational document—what a community believes fair use 
ought to be—than a descriptive one.”99  If all the libraries in the world agreed 
on the same definition of fair use, that definition would be no more legally 
binding than the one proposed by a single rights-holding plaintiff, and could 
only be truly relied upon after it had been tested in court.
In the end, a memory institution’s ability to rely on predicted fair use out-
comes will depend on the type and scale of the activity in which it wishes to 
engage, as well as the type of memory institution that it is.  Small-scale projects, 
such as digitizing a series of letters or exhibiting a handful of sound recordings 
onsite, are less likely to draw the ire of rights holders or to produce damages 
sufficient to justify a lawsuit.  Uses that alter the format or purpose of a work, 
or that provide identifiable commentary on the work, will have a stronger case 
for fair use than uses that simply copy.  State sovereign immunity renders many 
state-owned memory institutions immune from copyright damages,100 which 
allows those institutions to be less risk-averse than their nonstate-owned 
peers.  In general, however, the larger the scope of a potentially-infringing 
project is, the fewer memory institutions will be willing or able to rely on an 
uncertain fair use defense to pursue it.  This means that for some large-scale, 
socially beneficial projects—especially those involving orphan works and mass 
furthered by allowing the copyright owner full control or instead allowing fair use, and 
relatedly, whether the defendant’s use is likely to invade a ‘traditional, reasonable, or 
likely to be developed’ market under the market-harm factor.”).
98 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Google 
Books].
99 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 45. 
100 Section 108 Study Group, supra note 61, at 30.
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digitization—a lack of predictability can render the fair use defense essentially 
‘useless.’  
2. What Can Existing Doctrine Tell Us About the Viability 
of the Fair Use Defense in the Context of Orphan Works 
and Mass Digitization?
Despite a robust body of scholarship on fair use and orphan works, no 
court has issued a definitive ruling on the subject.101  Some scholars have argued 
that fair use promises a “powerful tool for freeing the orphans” languishing in 
memory institution’s collections102; the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) has 
asserted that “recent advances in fair use law [outside the context of orphan 
works] sufficiently address LCA needs.”103  Moreover, courts have indicated a 
general willingness to consider copying of fragile works for preservation pur-
poses fair use,104 and it is arguable that preservation copies of orphan works 
serve an even more compelling public interest than preservation copies of non-
orphans, “as with no owner to preserve them or give permission for others to 
do so, orphans are at particular risk of being lost.”105  The Copyright Office, 
however, remains convinced that fair use will provide only limited utility to 
potential orphan-works users who wish to “ensure peace of mind, avoid unpre-
dictability, or, more likely, to avoid exposure to liability.”106  Certain, specific 
uses of orphan works are likely to be fair uses; others are not, and the uncertain 
risk of liability continues to deter what may well be totally harmless uses.107
In contrast, recent litigation has provided substantial insight into the 
interaction of fair use and mass digitization.  The most famous (or infamous) 
mass digitization project pre–CLASSICs Act was the “Google Books” project, 
which in 2004 “embarked on an unprecedented feat to digitize and index vir-
tually all of the world’s literary works”—a feat that continues today.108  Many 
of the books that Google Books makes available to its users are still protected 
by copyright, although most are out of print.109  Depending on the copyright 
status of the work, Google Books may provide a full view, limited preview, 
snippet view, or no preview of a book’s text.110  The Google Books search func-
101 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 42–43.
102 Urban, supra note 98, at 1429.
103 Aaron C. Young, Copyright’s Not So Little Secret: The Orphan Works Problem and Pro-
posed Orphan Works Legislation, 7 Cybaris Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 202, 238 (2016). 
104 See, e.g., Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).
105 Urban, supra note 98, at 1417.
106 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 40–41.
107 Helen Sedwick, The Problem of Orphan Works, Helen Sedwick (last visited Mar. 
8, 2019), http://helensedwick.com/the-problem-of-orphan-works [https://perma.cc/
N9ZY-VQ8F].
108 Busse, supra note 80, at 121.
109 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 207–08.
110 Busse, supra note 80, at 134, citing What You’ll See When You Search on Google Books, 
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tion, which allows users to search for any string of text anywhere in the millions 
of books in the Google Library Project’s digital corpus, enables instant access 
to identifying information “otherwise not be obtainable in lifetimes of search-
ing.”111  Google’s “ngrams” research function, which allows users to track the 
frequency of word and phrase usage over time, has become an “instrument of 
pioneering linguistic research.”112
In September of 2005, the Authors Guild filed a putative class action 
against Google Books on behalf of rights-owning authors whose books had 
been digitized and uploaded to Google Books’ digital corpus.113  The Second 
Circuit’s eventual holding in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. (decided in 2015 
and typically referred to as Google Books) established the defining framework 
for fair use and mass digitization.  On appeal, the Authors Guild presented five 
distinct arguments against fair use:
First, [the Authors Guild argued] that Google’s digitization of in-copyright 
books and display of snippets on its website are not transformative under 
Campbell.  Second, that Google’s commercial intentions preclude a finding 
of fair use, specifically because Google utilizes digitized books to expand its 
dominance in the Internet search engine market.  Third, that Google’s dig-
itization and display of snippets infringe the copyright holder’s derivative 
rights.  Fourth, that Google’s use expose the copyright holder’s to a signifi-
cant risk of infringement if the digitized copies were ever lost to hackers or 
the like.  Finally, Google’s distribution of digitized copies to its member-li-
braries is not transformative and exposes copyright holders to loss of sales 
to libraries.114
In a landmark ruling, the Second Circuit rejected all five of these argu-
ments and declared the entirety of Google Books’ mass digitization project 
to be fair use.115  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Leval defined Camp-
bell’s “transformative use” as a use “that communicates something new and 
different from the original or expands its utility.”116  Expanding on its prior 
decision in Hathitrust,117 the Second Circuit declared Google Books’ search 
function to have “highly transformative purpose.”118  Although Google’s digi-
tized books were exact copies of the original, copyrighted works, the process 
of digitization resulted in copies that “served a different purpose than the orig-
inal” and allowed a level of research and scholarship impossible absent the 
Google Books (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://books.google.com/googlebooks/ 
library/screenshots.html [https://perma.cc/TU2P-VPQM].
111 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 207, 209.
112 Busse, supra note 80, at 135.
113 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 202.
114 Busse, supra note 80, at 138.
115 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 202.
116 Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
117 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014).
118 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 216.
100 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 26:79
projects unique and added functions.119  In the “absence of significant substi-
tutive competition with the original,” the commercial purpose of the Google 
Books project was outweighed by the project’s “highly convincing transfor-
mative purpose”120; because Google Books provided only searchable snippets 
of the copyrighted works, its copies were not considered “meaningful substi-
tute[s]” for libraries or the public at large.121  Finally, Google books did not 
infringe on authors’ derivative works rights because “[t]he copyright result-
ing from the Plaintiffs’ authorship of their works does not include an exclusive 
right to furnish the kind of information about the works that Google’s pro-
grams provide to the public.”122  The exposure-to-piracy argument, while a 
“theoretically sound” component of the fair use analysis, was “not supported 
by the evidence” and would need to be addressed, if at all, in the context of a 
demonstrable risk that lack of security could result in Google’s copies becom-
ing meaningful (and piratable) substitutes for the original works.123
Although the Second Circuit’s decision in Google Books reads as a 
ringing endorsement of fair use and mass digitization, the legacy of the case 
remains unclear.  The mass digitization project in Google Books was evalu-
ated and authorized—as all fair uses are—only on a “case-by-case” basis.124 
Parties relying on Google Books to support a fair use defense are left won-
dering which aspects of the Google Books project actually tipped the scales 
in favor of fair use.  Was it the ngrams function?  The snippets view?  The 
security measures that Google employed to prevent user abuse of the system? 
Just a few months before passage of the CLASSICs Act, another Second Cir-
cuit decision in Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc. shed light on these 
questions—and not in the way that proponents of the Google Books decision 
might have hoped.  TVEyes, which advertises itself as “the search engine for 
broadcast,”125 was sued by Fox News for copyright infringement of Fox News’ 
audiovisual content.  Two functions of the TVEyes service were at issue: a text-
based search function, which Fox did not challenge on appeal, and a “Watch” 
function, which it did.  Users of the Watch function were able to search for clips 
containing certain search terms, then watch up to 10 minutes of recorded con-
tent with an accompanying transcript; they could also archive and email clips 
to nonsubscribers.  Fox alleged that TVEyes users could essentially watch live 
Fox content in high resolution on the site for free, and that by providing full 
119 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.
120 Google Books, 804 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 223.
122 Id. at 225.
123 Id. at 227.
124 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78.
125 See Tveyes (last visited Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.tveyes.com [https://perma.cc/
EU5S-5F9T].
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segments based on user’s search terms, TVEyes was selling Fox’s core product 
without a license.
Both parties in Fox “rel[ied] most heavily on Google Books” for their 
arguments, with TVEyes claiming that the Watch function was no more than 
a broadcast version of the Google Books search function.126  The Second Cir-
cuit disagreed.  Concluding that TVEyes’s “Watch function has only a modest 
transformative character,” the Court focused its analysis on the fourth prong 
of Section 107: market impact.127  Here, the medium of the copyrighted mate-
rial became a core factor in the fair use analysis.  A ten-minute audiovisual 
clip is, according to the court, fundamentally different than a few-page snippet 
of a book; the Watch function is “likely provide TVEyes’s users with all of the 
Fox programming that they seek,” and thus to reduce Fox’s potential market.128 
The hypothetical availability of a license for Fox’s content (TVEyes originally 
sought a license, but was unable to reach an agreement with Fox129) played into 
the analysis as well.  Because the right to distribute Fox content through its ser-
vice is presumably valuable to TVEyes, the court held that TVEyes “should be 
willing to pay Fox for the right to offer the content . . . and by selling access to 
Fox’s audiovisual content without a license, TVEyes deprives Fox of revenues 
to which Fox is entitled as the copyright holder.”130
The courts have yet to address a mass digitization project of sound 
recordings as fair use.  However, I will argue in Part IV that the Second Cir-
cuit’s holding in Fox should give pause to even the most zealous supporters of 
mass digitization as fair use.  Especially for risk-averse memory institutions, 
fair use will be an inadequate mechanism to support the mass digitization of 
sound recordings.  If we believe that such projects are desirable endeavors for 
memory institutions to undertake, then we will need to establish an alternate 
legal framework to do so.
III. The CLASSICs Act and Orphan Works
For the purposes of this section, I will consider the impact of the CLAS-
SICs Act on memory institutions’ activities involving small-scale use of orphan 
pre–72 sound recordings.  Large-scale use is addressed in Part IV, as such use will 
almost inevitably be part of mass digitization projects.  Examples of small-scale 
orphan work activities involving sound recordings could include digitizing a 
single recording and making it available to the public online, copying a record-
ing for use in a historical documentary, or even curating an exhibition and 
public performance of a group of recordings.131
126 Fox News Network, LLC v. Tveyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018).  
127 Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 179.
129 Id. at 175.
130 Id. at 180.
131 It is important to note that public performance rights for pre–72 sound recordings 
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A. Responses to the Orphan Works Problem
The first and most obvious impact of the CLASSICs Act on the orphan 
works problem stems from the CLASSICs Act’s main function: it provides 
basic and uniform federal copyright protections to pre–72 sound recordings. 
Prior to the CLASSICs Act, pre–72 sound recordings were entirely the subjects 
of state law, which presented a mind-boggling series of legal dilemmas for any 
memory institution seeking to use them.132  If a work is truly an orphan, how 
can a memory institution predict which state courts could have jurisdiction 
over it?  What sorts of defenses could be available to nonprofits or educa-
tional entities in a particular state?  What sorts of uses would even qualify as 
infringement?  Pre–CLASSICs Act, the Section 108 defense was presumably 
unavailable for pre–72 sound recordings, and any fair use determination would 
happen under state statute or common law rather than the Section 107 test.133 
The permissible uses of orphan works are hard enough to determine under 
federal law; a memory institution confronted with 50+ competing bodies of 
state law can hardly be blamed for abandoning projects at the start.
Recognizing the immense challenge that the state/federal divide posed to 
memory institutions, prominent voices among memory institutions have long 
called for the federalization of pre–72 sound recording copyrights.134  The Asso-
ciation for Recorded Sound Collections, the Music Library Association, and 
a number of other groups banded together in 2008 to establish the Histori-
cal Recording Coalition for Access and Preservation, which urged Congress to 
address the “massive confusion . . . [stemming from a] welter of state laws” by 
repealing 17 U.S.C. 301(c).135  Ten years later, these groups have finally achieved 
their goal: 17 U.S.C. 301(c) has been repealed and replaced by the CLASSICs 
Act, and pre–72 sound recordings are entitled to the same Sections 108 and 
107 defenses as post–72 sound recordings.  As a bonus, the musical works data-
base established in Title I of the MMA may one day provide a powerful and 
long-desired tool for memory institutions hoping to identify their orphans at 
minimal cost—the effectiveness of the database remains to be seen.136,137
outside the limited digital audio performance right granted by the CLASSICs Act re-
main the subject of state law.  Each one of these potential fair uses would involve legal 
inquiry beyond the scope of this paper; however, all are reasonably likely (and benefi-
cial) uses of orphan works for a memory institution to engage in.
132 See generally Pre–72 Sound Recordings Report, supra note 13, at 20–47. 
133 For an explanation of some of the difficulties involved in preserving pre–72 sound re-
cordings under state law, see The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 
108–11.
134 The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 129–132. 
135 Id.
136 Music Modernization Act, S. 2334, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted).
137 A similar database is proposed by the National Recording Preservation Board as a par-
tial orphan works solution.  The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 
43.
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Within the CLASSICs Act, two provisions directly address the orphan 
works problem: Section 1401(f)(1)(B) and Section 1401(c).  Section 1401(f)(1) 
is tied to both fair use and Section 108; Section 1401(c) is a standalone orphan 
works provision.  Both provisions have the potential to be helpful to memory 
institutions seeking to engage in small-scale use of orphan works, but both are 
limited in scope and require an unknown amount of upfront investment of the 
memory institution’s resources.
1. Section 1401(f)(1): Fair Use: Uses by Libraries, Archives, and 
Educational Institutions
Section 1401(f)(1) of the CLASSICs Act has two functions: 1) it explic-
itly incorporates the limitations on a copyright holder’s exclusive rights in 107, 
108, 109, 110, and 112(f) for pre–72 sound recordings, and 2) it provides a rule 
of construction for Section 108(h).  Specifically, the provision reads:
(f) LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES.—
(1) FAIR USE; USES BY LIBRARIES, ARCHIVES, AND EDU CA - 
TIONAL INSTITUTIONS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The limitations on the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner described in sections 107, 108, 109, 110, and 112(f) shall apply to a 
claim under subsection (a) with respect to a sound recording fixed before 
February 15, 1972.
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION FOR SECTION 108(H).—With respect 
to the application of section 108(h) to a claim under subsection (a) with 
respect to a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, the phrase 
‘during the last 20 years of any term of copyright of a published work’ in 
such section 108(h) shall be construed to mean at any time after the date of 
enactment of this section.
The title of the provision, “Fair Use: Uses by Libraries, Archives, and Edu-
cational Institutions,” is (perhaps deliberately) misleading.  There is no special 
or added fair use defense for libraries, archives, and educational institutions 
in the CLASSICs Act.  The legislation incorporates Section 107 ‘as is,’ which 
means that the discussion of fair use doctrine and its relation to orphan works 
in Part II remains unchanged.  The incorporation of Section 107 in the CLAS-
SICs Act does close a potential loophole in the statute: the Copyright Office 
has remained adamant that any copyright reform legislation should explic-
itly maintain the fair use defense, lest an enterprising rights holder attempt to 
argue that modifications to the Copyright Act were intended to eliminate or 
weaken the defense.138  However, importing Section 107 unchanged into the 
138 See Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 16 (“At the same time, the Office 
emphasizes that any revision of section 108 must include the current fair use savings 
clause without modification to ensure that fair use remains an important safety valve 
and is available to libraries and archives in situations not addressed by the text of sec-
tion 108.  Indeed, the Office would not recommend any legislation that did not include 
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world of pre–72 sound recordings means importing  Section 107’s limitations as 
well.  Memory institutions can be grateful that they now have only one body of 
fair use legal precedent to decipher—but parts of that precedent remain unde-
cipherable, especially where orphan works are concerned.
The rule of construction for Section 108(h) does introduce a new wrin-
kle for pre–72 sound recordings, the significance of which may turn out to be 
profound.  Prior to passage of the CLASSICs Act, the level of research and 
resource investment needed to comply with the conditions of Section 108(h) 
often rendered the exception “more trouble than it [was] worth” for librar-
ies and archives.139  After passage of the CLASSICs Act, however, the calculus 
of Section 108(h) has arguably been changed.  The number of pre–72 sound 
recordings potentially eligible to be reproduced, distributed, displayed and 
performed under Section 108(h) is immense, and for some memory institu-
tions, may represent the majority of their sound recording collections.  The 
rule of construction in Section 1401(f)(1)(B) is, moreover, a strikingly gener-
ous one: it means that sound recordings published as late as 1971 will fall under 
the Section 108(h) exception beginning in 2018.  In contrast, a work published 
in 1978 will not qualify for the Section 108(h) exception until 50 years after the 
death of its author.  Consider an author that was 30 years old at time of pub-
lication in 1978, who then died at the age of 80: that means no Section 108(h) 
protection until 2078.
To take advantage of Section 1401(f)(1)(B) of the CLASSICs Act, a 
memory institution will be required to determine, “on the basis of a reason-
able investigation,” that the conditions of Section 108(h)(2) are met.140  What 
a “reasonable investigation” would look like here is unclear, and may well be 
the subject of future litigation.  The interaction between Section 1401(f)(1)(B) 
and Section 1401(c), which allows noncommercial use of an orphan work sub-
sequent to a “good faith, reasonable search” for the rights holder, is a likely 
point of contention.  Is a “reasonable investigation” the same as a “good faith, 
reasonable search”?  Which burden is higher?  Do we expect more or less 
from our memory institutions than we do from private users of orphan works? 
Depending on its requirements, such a “reasonable investigation” may or may 
not be economically feasible for a memory institution.  It is far more likely to 
be conducted on a small-scale or single-work basis rather than for a collec-
tion at large.
A final and fundamental problem limits the power of Section 1401(f)(1)
(B) for memory institutions: Section 108 eligibility.  Although relevant stake-
holders speaking with the Copyright Office in 2016 “universally agreed on 
adding museums as an eligible entity” under Section 108, the CLASSICs Act 
the fair use savings clause.”).
139 Hansen, supra note 47, at 1584.
140 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(2) (2012).
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made no changes to Section 108 eligibility.141  Why not?  The answer could 
hinge on any number of factors, including the limited scope of the CLASSICs 
Act,142 a general prioritization of the rights of labels, publishers, and artists over 
memory institutions,143 or simple forgetfulness.  The current exclusion of muse-
ums from Section 108 places ever-increasing pressure on memory institutions 
to treat fair use as their primary mechanism for limiting future liability, inject-
ing unnecessary uncertainty into the copyright system.  Museum inclusion is 
uncontroversial, an “obvious addition”144 that would reflect modern under-
standings of libraries, archives, and museums as entities with strikingly similar 
purposes and could  be accomplished with or without additional eligibility 
requirements suggested in the Copyright Office’s Model Statutory Language.145 
However, given that the CLASSICs Act did not make changes to Section 108 
eligibility, the viability of the Section 108 (and Section 1401(f)(1)(B)) as a solu-
tion to the orphan works problem is limited from the start.  Once again, the 
outdated nature of Section 108 will push memory institutions toward heavier 
reliance on fair use, and the unpredictability of fair use will limit memory insti-
tution activities.
2. Section 1401(c): Certain Noncommercial Uses of Sound 
Recordings That Are Not Being Commercially Exploited
Section 1401(c) of the CLASSICs Act is a standalone orphan works pro-
vision of the kind long-advocated-for by both memory institutions and the 
Copyright Office.146,147  Like the federalization of pre–72 sound recordings 
itself, this provision is not all that supporters might have hoped for.  It does, 
however, represent a significant step forward for memory institutions seeking 
to engage in small-scale, noncommercial use of orphan works.  The provision 
reads as follows:
141 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 18 (emphasis added).
142 The CLASSICs act concerns only pre–72 sound recordings, while a museum amend-
ment to Section 108(a) would presumably impact all copyrighted works.
143 Debates among these groups certainly would have been enough to keep the legislation’s 
drafters busy, and it is difficult to tell how strong a voice memory institutions had at the 
table during the MMA’s passage.
144 Hansen, supra note 47, at 1592.
145 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 19.
146 See Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 56–58, describing the Copy-
right Office’s suggestion for limitations on remedies for good faith users of orphan 
works.
147 The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act (S.2913), a piece of far wider-reaching orphan 
works legislation, passed the Senate in 2008 and remains the Copyright Office’s desired 
orphan works framework.  See Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 3. 
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§  1401(c): CERTAIN NONCOMMERCIAL USES OF SOUND 
RECORDINGS THAT ARE NOT BEING COM MERCIALLY 
EX PLOITED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Noncommercial use of a sound recording fixed before 
February 15, 1972, that is not being commercially exploited by or under the 
authority of the rights owner shall not violate subsection (a) if—
(A) the person engaging in the noncommercial use, in order to determine 
whether the sound recording is being commercially exploited by or under 
the authority of the rights owner, makes a good faith, reasonable search for, 
but does not find, the sound recording—(i) in the records of schedules filed 
in the Copyright Office as described in subsection (f)(5)(A); and (ii) on ser-
vices offering a comprehensive set of sound recordings for sale or streaming; 
(B) the person engaging in the noncommercial use files a notice identify-
ing the sound recording and the nature of the use in the Copyright Office in 
accordance with the regulations issued under paragraph (3)(B); and
(C) during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the notice 
described in subparagraph (B) is indexed into the public records of the Copy-
right Office, the rights owner of the sound recording does not, in its discretion, 
opt out of the noncommercial use by filing notice thereof in the Copyright 
Office in accordance with the regulations issued under paragraph (5).
 . . .  
(4) SAFE HARBOR.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—A person engaging in a noncommercial use of a 
sound recording otherwise permitted under good faith, reasonable search 
under paragraph (1)(A) without finding commercial exploitation of the 
sound recording by or under the authority of the rights owner shall not be 
found to be in violation of subsection (a).
Under Section 1401(c), any memory institution—library, archive, 
museum, university, etc.—may, after a diligent search and filing of notice, 
engage in noncommercial use of a pre–72 sound recording that is not being 
commercially exploited.  Noncommercial uses could include reproductions and 
distributions otherwise authorized by Section 108 and far more.  In situations 
when the Section 1401(c) is available, in fact, there seems to be little reason 
to rely on Section 108.  Consider a museum that wishes to digitize a series of 
orphan pre–72 sound recordings and make them available to the public online. 
This activity is certainly not covered by Section 108 and may or may not pass 
the test of Section 107; the safe harbor of Section 1401(c) provides a new and 
promising path toward bringing more orphan works out into the public view.
How often and how effectively memory institutions are able to take 
advantage of Section 1401(c) will depend on the costs associated with a “good 
faith, reasonable search” and notice filing with the Copyright Office.  Here, 
the Copyright Office’s recently published regulations—which become effec-
tive May 9, 2019—provide crucial guidance for what a legally sufficient search 
would look like.  A party seeking to make noncommercial use of a sound 
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recording would have to check for evidence of commercial exploitation in the 
following places, listed in sequential order.148
1. The Copyright Office’s database of Pre–1972 Schedules;
2. One of the following major search engines: Google, Yahoo!, or Bing;
3. One of the following major streaming services: Amazon Music Unlimited, 
Apple Music, Spotify, or TIDAL;
4. YouTube, for authorized uses;
5. The SoundExchange ISRC database;
6. Amazon.com, and, where the prospective user reasonably believes the 
recording implicates a listed niche genre, an additional listed online retailer 
of physical product; and
7. In the case of ethnographic Pre–1972 Sound Recordings of Alaska Native 
or American Indian tribes, searching through contacting the relevant tribe, 
association, and/or holding institution.
This clear, step-by-step approach is a massive improvement on the 
status quo for memory institutions seeking to engage in noncommercial use 
of their pre–1972 sound recording collections.  By completing this seven-step 
search and filing a notice of noncommercial use with the Copyright Office, 
memory institutions can acquire an affirmative shield from liability—one that 
did not exist pre–CLASSICs Act.  Logistical challenges inherent to the han-
dling orphan works will likely continue to plague the system.  A qualifying 
search under Section 1401(c) must include, for example, the title and featured 
artists of the work149; the extent to which an unidentified orphan work could 
qualify for protection remains unclear.  Unless song recordings come from the 
same pre–1972 album with same featured artist, notices of noncommercial use 
can cover only one sound recording at a time.150  This requirement means that 
memory institutions will have to repeat the search and filing process with each 
individual recording they want to use, despite the fact that orphan works are 
often very difficult to find.  Still, for many small-scale or single-use orphan 
works projects, a clear roadmap to avoid infringement liability may make the 
difference between feasibility and infeasibility.  To the extent that memory 
institutions choose to use it, Section 1401(c) provides an exciting new tool for 
combatting the orphan works problem.
Although Section 1401(c) places memory institutions in a better position 
to address the orphan works problem than they were pre–CLASSICs Act, it is 
important to recall that Section 1401(c) is much more conservative than the 
“limitations on remedies” provision recommended by the Copyright Office. 
Its limited application to noncommercial use presents a challenge even to 
148 Noncommercial Use of Pre–1972 Sound Recordings That Are Not Being Commercially 
Exploited, 84 Fed. Reg. 14,243 (Apr. 9, 2019) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Pt. 201).
149 37 C.F.R. § 201.37(c)(2) (2019).
150 Id. § 201.37(d)(4).
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nonprofit memory institutions.  The Copyright Office’s 2015 report on Orphan 
Works and Mass Digitization urged that “future orphan works legislation apply 
to . . . all types of users, noncommercial and commercial” specifically because 
the “distinction [between noncommercial and commercial use] is quite likely 
to break down in practice.”151  As an example, the Copyright Office referenced 
a public television documentary; it is easy to imagine a memory institution 
like the Smithsonian (which alternates identities as a museum, library, archive, 
and United States trust instrumentality) seeking to invoke Section 1401(c) 
to protect use of a pre–72 orphan sound recording in a Smithsonian Chan-
nel documentary.152  Section 1401(c)(2) provides some guidance here, stating 
that a user is not barred from Section 1401(c) protection merely because it 
recovers costs of production and distribution, nor because the user engages in 
other commercial activities.  As the Copyright Office rightly points out, how-
ever, uses that are initially noncommercial do not always remain so.  Public 
documentaries can be later sold or licensed; public exhibitions can produce 
revenue through souvenir and book sales; orphan works recovery projects can 
(and arguably should153) be pitched to donors to draw financial support for the 
memory institution at large.  The Copyright Office declined to establish a firm 
standard for commercial versus noncommercial use in the regulations for Sec-
tion 1401(c), stating only that it will consider the issue as it develops public 
circulars and materials on the exception.154  In the meantime, uncertainty about 
the commercial versus noncommercial determination is likely to hamper Sec-
tion 1401(c)’s effectiveness for memory institutions.
IV. The CLASSICs Act and Mass Digitization
The following Part considers the potential effects the CLASSICs Act on 
mass digitization of pre–72 sound recordings, the continuing viability of the fair 
use defense, and the need for more a reliable legal framework for mass digi-
tization projects moving forward.  It concludes that even modest revisions to 
Section 108 could go far toward allowing some less-controversial and time-sen-
sitive mass digitization projects, the current limitations on which do little to 
serve the overarching goals of memory institutions or copyright law at large.
151 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, supra note 19, at 54–55.
152 See, e.g., Smithsonian Channel: Documentaries (last visited Mar. 8, 2019), https://
www.smithsonianchannel.com/shows [https://perma.cc/R58P-L4KJ]. 
153 See, e.g., The State of Sound Recording Preservation, supra note 3, at 113.  The authors 
highlight the reality that “[i]t is virtually impossible . . . to attract grants and donors to 
support preservation of collections that will not be accessible once preservation occurs. 
Access is often crucial to attracting support for the preservation of specific collections 
or recordings.”  Id. 
154 Noncommercial Use of Pre–1972 Sound Recordings That Are Not Being Commercially 
Exploited, supra note 149, at 14,242.
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A. Federalization, Section 1401(f)(1)(B), and Section 1401(c)
As with orphan works, the federalization of pre–72 sound recordings 
accomplished by the CLASSICs Act represents a positive step for memory 
institutions seeking to engage in mass digitization.  Prior to the CLASSICs Act, 
pre–72 sound recordings were not eligible for the Section 107 fair use defense, 
which means that the favorable Google Books precedent did not apply.  The 
same difficulties associated with determining the legally permissible uses 
of a single pre–72 sound recording under state law applied to mass digitiza-
tion, but on an exponential scale; as the National Recording Preservation 
Board lamented in 2010, strict enforcement of the law would have “brand[ed] 
virtually all audio preservation [including mass digitization] as illegal.”155  Post–
CLASSICs Act, some mass digitizations of pre–72 sound recordings may well 
be permissible—the question is, which ones?
The CLASSICs Act contains no provision specifically addressing mass 
digitization, which means that Section 1401(f)(1) and Section 1401(c) remain 
the primary sources of change created by the Act for memory institutions. 
However, the utility of both provisions for mass digitization projects is limited 
by the nature of mass digitization itself.  The requirements of a “reasonable 
investigation” to take advantage of Section 1401(f)(1)(B) and a “good faith, 
reasonable search” in Section 1401(c) make both provisions impractical—
and perhaps impossible—for memory institutions to employ as infringement 
defenses for mass digitization projects.  A 2010 study on digitization of the 
Thomas E. Watson papers, conducted at the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, helps to illustrate why.156  The study tracked costs incurred by con-
ducting due diligence for each document in the Watson papers, and found that 
due diligence efforts cost about $1,050 per linear foot of correspondence.157  At 
the end of their efforts, the archivists received permission to display just four 
letters online: at a cost of $2000 per letter.158  Rather than continuing their due 
diligence efforts, the archivists consulted legal counsel, who informed them 
that the risk of infringement was far enough outweighed by due diligence costs 
that they should simply rely on fair use.159
Even if a memory institution was financially able to conduct the “good 
faith, reasonable search” required by Section 1401(c), there is no guarantee that 
a court would find mass digitization to be a noncommercial use.  The existence 
of a statutory licensing scheme for pre–72 recordings (also accomplished by 
the CLASSICs Act) weighs in favor of considering large-scale uses of orphan 
155 The State of Sound Recording Preservation, supra note 3, at 7.
156 Maggie Dickson, Due Diligence, Futile Effort: Copyright and the Digitization of the 
Thomas E. Watson Papers, 73:2 Am. Archivist 626 (Fall/Winter 2010), https://www.jstor.
org/stable/23290761 [https://perma.cc/8EZH-AETZ].
157 Id.
158 Id. at 631.
159 I d. at 636.
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sound recordings to be commercial use, because such use displaces a well-es-
tablished market.  Requiring research to calculate the potential market harm of 
a mass digitization project places yet another burden on memory institutions, 
while restricting access to minimize market harm undercuts the public bene-
fit that mass digitization projects can produce.  Ultimately, the CLASSICs Act 
allows most of the legal and logistical obstacles to mass digitization to remain 
in place, and leaves memory institutions wondering how many resources they 
should be willing to risk on mass digitization projects.
B. Mass Digitization of Pre–72 Sound Recordings and Fair Use
Now that pre–72 sound recordings are governed by Section 107, propo-
nents of fair use as a mass digitization solution are sure to claim that mass 
digitizations of pre–72 sound recordings can be permissible under Google 
Books.  In contrast, I argue that the Google Books/Fox framework discussed 
above is unlikely to protect mass digitization of pre–72 sound recordings as fair 
use.  Moreover, there is good reason not to want fair use to authorize mass digi-
tization, as the fair use framework serves neither the interests of rights holders 
nor the overarching goals of mass digitization.
The primary problem for conducting mass digitization projects of pre–72 
sound recordings under Google Books is what those projects would have 
to look like to be considered fair use.  The Second Circuit allowed Google 
Books’ search and ngrams functions because those functions “served a dif-
ferent function from the original.”160  What kind of different purpose would 
a mass digitization of sound recordings serve?  Preservation is one purpose, 
but preservation does not require that sound recordings be available to the 
public (even if obtaining funding for preservation does).  Research is another 
purpose, but research involving sound recordings typically requires that the 
recording be heard in its entirety, over and over, without any alteration to the 
original—a ‘snippet’ format would substantially impair a recording’s research 
value.161  What researchers need from a digital copy is a “meaningful substitute” 
for the original, exactly the kind of use that is forbidden by Fox.162  Text-search-
able databases are likely permissible under Google Books and Fox, but any 
kind of text-searchable database for music sound recordings would implicate 
copyright in the underlying musical works, which is distinct from the copy-
right for sound recordings and raises its own complex set of infringement 
issues.  Finally, mass digitization of sound recordings could serve the purpose 
160 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.
161 The State of Recorded Sound Preservation, supra note 3, at 117 (“A survey of educators 
reported a consensus that ‘the music has to be heard repeatedly in the whole of the 
work, phrase by phrase, or note by note,’ and that researchers must be able to manip-
ulate the sound with the ability to ‘stop and start, slow down and speed up and even 
divide the music into layers.’”). 
162 Fox News Network, 883 F.3d at 177.
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of public access—for the most part, these recordings are meant to be studied 
and enjoyed, not to rot away in the basement of an archive.  Yet it is difficult 
to imagine a public-access-oriented mass digitization of sound recordings that 
looks substantially different from a memory-institution-Spotify.  Under Fox, a 
memory institution that wishes to provide a Spotify-esque service should be 
willing to behave like Spotify: it should license and pay royalties for the sound 
recordings if offers.163
Google Books demonstrates that the Section 107 factors can be inter-
preted to authorize at least some forms of mass digitization.  However, a key 
question remains as to whether fair use should be the primary legal mecha-
nism authorizing mass digitizations.  Some mass digitizations are more suited 
to Campbell’s “transformativeness” test than others, but the kinds of mass dig-
itizations that memory institutions are best-suited to engage in are primarily 
concerned with preserving and improving access to original, unaltered works—
not truly “transforming” anything.164  When the definition of transformativeness 
is expanded to include more and more types of verbatim copying, “copyright 
holders [risk] los[ing] control over their works and how they are used in digi-
tal contexts.”165  Yet when the definition of transformativeness excludes certain 
types of verbatim copying, it “understates the potential benefit that the public 
could derive from fully embracing mass digitization technologies.”166  For sound 
recordings especially, fair use is an unsatisfactory mechanism to rely on.  Until 
additional legislation is passed, the CLASSICs Act’s federalization of pre–72 
sound recordings does little to solve the mass digitization problem.
C. Mass Digitization and Section 108
Mass digitization of sound recordings, for ‘pure’ preservation purposes 
or for broader access projects, is wholly unprotected by the current form of 
Section 108.  In 2017, however, the Copyright Office released a discussion doc-
ument reaffirming “its belief that section 108 needs to be updated . . . [and that] 
current section 108 language is insufficient to address digital works and digital 
transmissions, does not reflect the way that libraries and archives actually oper-
ate, and excludes museums. . . .”167  Citing the “rare opportunity to benefit from 
Congress’ focus on copyright law in the digital era,” the Copyright Office pro-
posed a series of section 108 reforms, along with Model Statutory Language, 
addressing issues ranging from the organization and scope of the statute to dis-
tribution of audiovisual works.168  The Copyright Office’s proposed legislation 
163 Id. at 180. 
164 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
165 Marie-Alexis Valente, Transformativeness in the Age of Mass Digitization, 90 St. John’s 
L. Rev. 233, 262 (2016) (alteration to the original).
166 Busse, supra note 80, at 145.
167 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 1.
168 Id. at 2–3.
112 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 26:79
could go a long way toward authorizing some of least controversial and most 
time-sensitive mass digitization projects that memory institutions seek to 
undertake, including ‘pure’ preservation projects and user access projects lim-
ited to research and scholarship.
So far as ‘pure’ preservation projects are concerned, the Copyright 
Office’s 2017 Discussion Document recommended substantial changes to Sec-
tions 108(b) and (c), which it summarized as the following:
Preservation, Research, and Replacement Copies
Replace the current published/unpublished distinction with a new publicly 
disseminated/not publicly disseminated distinction, to better reflect the ways 
in which commercialized works are made available; 
Allow preservation copies to be made of all works in an eligible entity’s 
collections, with expanded access for copies of works that were not dissem-
inated to the public, a “dark archive” for publicly disseminated works, and 
replacement of the three-copy limit with a “reasonably necessary” standard;
 Expand the limits of what is allowed to be copied for research use in another 
institution, and replace the three-copy limit with a limit of what is “reasonably 
necessary” to result in a single end-use copy; and
Add “fragile” to the list of conditions that may trigger a replacement copy, expand 
off-premises access for replacement copies, and replace the three-copy 
limit with a limit of what is “reasonably necessary” to result in a single 
end-use copy.169
These four changes, although far from solving the mass digitization prob-
lem at large, would at least update the preservation provisions of Section 108 to 
make them workable in the digital age.  The “reasonably necessary” standard 
would restore the technological neutrality necessary to produce and preserve 
digital copies, bringing “the provision in line with actual practice and avoid[ing] 
the problem of libraries and archives having to engage in a time-consuming fair 
use analysis each time they want to make more than three copies of a work.”170 
The publicly disseminated/not publicly disseminated distinction would far 
better serve the overarching access goals of memory institutions, prioritizing 
the accessibility of materials unlikely to be available outside the institution. 
The addition of “fragile” to the conditions of Section 108(c) could be particu-
larly relevant to pre–72 sound recordings, which memory institutions are likely 
to possess in formats—such as lacquer discs or cassette tapes—vulnerable to 
unexpected breakage or decay.171  Finally, allowing preservation copies to be 
made of all works in an eligible entity’s collections (combined with the provi-
sion expanding Section 108 eligibility discussed above) would mean that any 
169 Id. at 2.
170 Id. at 25.
171 For a chart on various sound recording formats and risks of deterioration prepared by 
the Library of Congress Packard Campus for Audio Visual Conservation, see Pre–72 
Sound Recording Report, supra note 13, at 56. 
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eligible memory institution could confidently proceed with ‘pure’ preservation 
mass digitization projects, which would at the very least safeguard those collec-
tions for the day that they enter the public domain.
The Copyright Office has also suggested several revisions to Section 108 
that would allow for greater access to user copies, including eliminating Sec-
tion 108(i), allowing a flexible number of user copies to be made (which would 
enable digital copying for users), and adding limited rights of display and 
public performance for eligible memory institutions.172  Acknowledging that 
the audiovisual and musical works categories are “likely to have developed 
operating entertainment markets that may be harmed by unfettered copying 
for users,”173 the Office’s Model Statutory Language requires that electronic 
distribution, display, and performance of digital copies of such works “be made 
to only one user at a time, for a limited time.”174  Under this rule, an eligi-
ble memory institution could stream a digital copy of a sound recording to a 
requesting user for a limited time, significantly improving access for scholars 
and students attempting to study a particular work or set of works from afar.175 
One can imagine a kind of “library-Spotify” governed by this provision, through 
which students and researchers could “check out” a sound recording from a 
mass digitization archive, study the digitally streamed recording remotely for a 
limited amount of time, and then relinquish access to the next user.
The Copyright Office’s Section 108 recommendations are far from a 
perfect fix for the challenges of mass digitization.  However, removal of clear 
technology biases and obvious barriers to best practices from Section 108 has 
significant potential to elevate Section 108 as a viable protective mechanism, 
reducing reliance on fair use and granting much needed security to memory 
institutions.
Conclusion
By federalizing protection of pre–72 sound recordings, the CLASSICs 
Act finally provides a uniform landscape for memory institution use of pre–72 
sound recordings.  Particularly in the realm of small-scale use of orphan pre–72 
sound recordings, the CLASSICs Act provides greater certainty to memory 
institutions about what uses are permissible and what steps institutions can 
take to avoid costly infringement.  However, the CLASSICs Act does little 
to address the widespread confusion about the fair use defense’s application 
172 Id. at 3. 
173 Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 2, at 39.
174 Id. at 53.
175 Id. at 39.  As an example of this recommendation in practice, the Copyright Office pro-
vides: “If a motion picture archives is streaming a comedy routine from a 1967 episode 
of “Hollywood Chateau” to one user, and a second user requests the same work, the 
archives must wait until the first user’s limited time (e.g., two weeks) has expired before 
it streams a copy to the second user.”  Id.
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to orphan works and mass digitization, and fails to update Section 108—ren-
dering the Act’s incorporation of Sections 107 and 108 defenses ultimately 
inadequate to address memory institution needs.
The challenges presented by orphan works and mass digitization are 
most urgently troubling in the area of preservation.  Rare and orphan sound 
recordings are at risk of being lost to history if they are not properly preserved, 
and mass digitization (absent its legal problems) is currently the best way 
for memory institutions to prevent this time-sensitive loss.  At present, many 
memory institutions use a “fly under the radar” strategy to circumvent out-
dated copyright laws; unless ordered to stop, these institutions prioritize the 
security of their collections over full compliance with the law, relying (if forced 
to) on fair use.176  This state of affairs is far from desirable, especially when it 
could be remedied in large part through a single legislative act: adopting the 
Copyright Office’s preservation and replacement revisions to Section 108.
Moving forward, practitioners will need to look to the Copyright Office’s 
regulations to determine whether the orphan works solutions provided in Sec-
tion 1401(c) can be useful to memory institutions in practice.  Advocates for 
expanding mass digitization projects in memory institutions have a clear path 
through Section 108 revision, and should continue pushing to update preser-
vation requirements and include museums as eligible entities; future litigation 
clarifying Fox and Google Books may help provide answers about the viability 
of fair use as a mass digitization defense.  The CLASSICs Act could serve as a 
vital foundation to expand memory institutions’ ability to address the orphan 
works and mass digitization problems, but the legacy of the Act will ultimately 
be determined by legal developments outside of its control.  Museums, librar-
ies, archives, and lawyers alike will need to watch carefully to ensure that the 
CLASSICs Act “remembers” what it is supposed to protect.
176 The State of Sound Recording Preservation, supra note 3, at 113.
